




THE KEYS OF THE WEEK

March 18, 2024




The graph that I like or concern me this week:

The price of bitcoin which has doubled since the US authorities accepted ETFs not Bitcoin



To be continued this week The Fed meeting: still waiting for more precise information.



• What does the price of bitcoin represent? Page 2

By providing the possibility of offering bitcoin ETFs, the American stock exchange authorities have validated bitcoin as a speculative asset.

• Salaries in the Euro zone Page 3

The reference salary in the Euro zone has not fallen since the fall of 2023. Salary negotiations focus more on catching up at the risk of prolonging the inflationary drift.

• French growth and government forecasts Page 4

The new INSEE scenario for the French economy in 2024 does not appear compatible with the government's forecast of 1% for the whole of 2024.

This could then result in a more rigorous amending finance law if the objective is to maintain a public deficit at 4.4%.

• American inflation. Page 4

As in the Eurozone, American inflation has a persistent bias towards services, reflecting continued strong growth in wages.

• Are we ready? I don't believe Page 5

Observation of a global climatic situation which is perilous. The most worrying is a form of indifference in the face of the announced danger.

• Europe and the risks of climatic bifurcation Page 6

Europe is the fastest warming region in the world. Within this the situations are heterogeneous. This could result in tensions between countries as the new constraints reshuffle the cards.

• Video - What is the link between world population, climate change and energy transition? Page - 7

On the relationship between demography, carbon emissions, past and present, and the future increase of 2 billion individuals in the world population.




Philippe Waechter Chief Economist




My blog - Ostrum.philippewaechter.com

The question for March 18, 2024 - What does the price of bitcoin represent?

The price of bitcoin is now around \$70,000. Outside of thurifers, questions remain about the rationality of the valuation of this asset. For some, this would be the future of monetary systems, but it lacks theoretical foundations. For others, it is an object of speculative investment. The American authorities gave the answer to this existential question by authorizing the creation of ETFs (investment funds in transferable securities which can be listed on the stock exchange). Since then, the price has doubled. Bitcoin appears to be an asset reflecting the expectations of investors with the risk of significantly greater volatility.





Certainly, the environment is rather on the rise in financial markets in Western markets.

Stock markets are at their highest. The CAC 40 is above 8,000 points, the Nasdaq, the US technology stocks index are at their highest and even the Japanese Nikkei has returned to its level at the end of 1989. At the time, the Japanese economy was a scarecrow and in the US, the fear was that the influence of Japanese companies would reduce the capacity of the American economy to face technological challenges.

This confidence in corporate dynamics is reflected in the narrowing of interest rate spreads on corporate bonds and yields on government bonds.

The underlying idea is that the future requires the dynamism of companies to resolve the existential guestions that drive us. Whether it is that of our common future via the energy transition, or our potential to generate productivity and income via artificial intelligence.

Gold is also at an all-time high. The precious metal played its role during the period of inflation. The price of an ounce, deflated by the price increase in the USA, has been almost stable since the start of the inflationary episode. This deflated price has, since the first quarter of 2021, increased by 6% at the end of February. Gold has kept its promises against the risk of inflation.

The translation of these different elements is that the world will find solutions to the challenges it faces and in a context where whatever happens, States will be very present to pool and cushion shocks but also to provide impetus.

During the pandemic, but also, particularly in Europe, during the energy crisis the States were very active. They are also on the question of relocations and the renewal of industry in order to face the challenges of polarization and the uncertainties in the restructuring of the global economy.

In the very short term, the decline in inflation should result in a relaxation of monetary policies, a reduction in interest rates and the maintenance of strong liquidity. Factors which are always very favorable to the financial markets.

And, bitcoin in all this?

This cryptocurrency is a somewhat strange object, because it is not based on any real support. Stocks or corporate bonds are ultimately supported by the behavior of the underlying companies. Gold has the historical virtue of being a material and tangible asset, capable of retaining value, particularly in times of inflation. This is what was mentioned above.

But, what is the support for bitcoin? What question is this asset supposed to answer? The technical answer on the use of blockchain technology is not sufficient.

Often, the argument put forward for the use of bitcoin is that of a currency that would supplement financial systems. In other words, these models refer to the idea that currencies issued by central banks are not efficient and that it would be desirable to have private currencies that compete. An exchange rate would exist between private currencies.

The temptation for existing systems is to expand the capacity to create more money, suggesting the possibility of a form of headlong flight that could lead to instability. Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, by construction, avoid this risk by defining an outstanding amount which cannot be exceeded for technical reasons. There is still an element missing from decentralized currency because the issuance of currency itself is centralized.

The next step was to develop the ability of bitcoin to effectively be a transaction currency. It worked a little, but the lack of liquidity weakened this essential property of money. There can be transactions but this currency does not seem to have the capacity to supplant the currency of central banks for current transactions.

Although it cannot be a transaction currency with all the required qualities, bitcoin is now considered an investment asset. On January 10, the American authorities authorized a bitcoin ETF. Large US management companies rushed in. The size of ETFs grew very quickly, quickly reaching \$50 billion, the price was affected, going from \$46,000 on January 10 to 70,000 in mid-March.

Finally, the possibility of creating ETFs on bitcoin validated the idea that it was a speculative asset reflecting, surely excessively, the expectations of investors.

Its profile should not be very different, in trend, from that of other risky assets, for which the rationality of prices is more assured, but with the risk of greater volatility.

FT MANAGEMEN





Wage dynamics in the Euro zone

- Since October 2023, wage growth in the Euro zone has been higher than that of inflation.
- This does not make up for the delay incurred during the period of high inflation but it puts an end to excessively divergent developments between prices and remuneration.
- However, the adjustment mechanism is somewhat hampered, at the risk of causing a more persistent inflationary dynamic.
- Salary negotiations are generally based on inflation expectations. This works quite well when the inflation rate is stable and low. This is what happened for a very long time in the Eurozone. In this way, with a little productivity on the side, the wage dynamic was not inflationary.
- With the highest inflation, the benchmarks changed and salary negotiations were carried out more in a catch-up mode than in anticipation. This is what we see in the second graph. The salary profile adjusts to the annual change in the inflation rate measured as the difference in price increases over one year.
- The increase in energy prices (+43% since the first quarter of 2021) and food (+24% over the same period) has fueled the need for additional catch-up. This is reflected, on the second graph, by a divergence, since the end of autumn 2023, between the trend of wages and the measurement of the annual change in inflation.
- This catch-up on wages generates upward pressure on the price of services (the formation of the price of services is strongly conditioned by the salary profile. There is little productivity unlike industry and it is a sector intensive in work).

As long as this catch-up is not complete, there may be resistance to the decline in inflation.

- In France, salary measures are falling (Indeed measure) and should do so for the measures of the Ministry of Labor (Darès)
- For eurozone countries, there is no systematic slowdown in wages, particularly in Germany.









SET MANAGEMEN

Enhancing y power to act

French growth and government forecasts

- In its economic note of mid-March, INSEE reviews the profile of the first half of 2024. Instead of 0.2% in each of the first two guarters, the institute expects 0% in Q1 and 0.3% in Q2.
- On the graph, I have set the profile of GDP in France conditionally on the achievement of an average growth rate of 1% in 2024 according to Bercy's expectations.

To reach 1% in 2024, the benchmark is 0.32% in rces: Datastream; Ostrum AM; ostrum.philippe each quarter of the year. Following the INSEE scenario, 0.8% would be needed in each of the last two guarters of 2024 to converge towards 1%. If the economy reproduces the profile of 2023 then the growth rate would be 0.7%. Clearly 1% appears excessive for the whole year. Firstly because 0.3% each quarter appears too high in view of the recent past and the

situation in the first quarter. In the INSEE scenario, we do not see very clearly the source of impetus which would allow us to jump to 0.8% in the second part of the year. Bruno Le Maire was very discreet on this point in his televised intervention. The 2023 remake is very advantageous but unlikely because the first two quarters were very strong, which seems unlikely this year.

In other words, Bercy's expectations are surely excessive. This means that we must expect a corrective Finance Law if the objective is to keep the public deficit at 4.4% of GDP.

Page 4

American inflation

- The inflation rate is slowing but the decline has reached a plateau in the Euro zone and now also in the United States. It is still very low in China.
- Since October 2023, the price increase has been a little higher in the USA than in the Euro zone. whereas it was the opposite previously since summer 2022.

We must see basic effects on the price of energy. In the Euro zone the increase had been stronger and more lasting, as a result, the drop in particular in the price of gas and electricity (mainly responsible for the rise in energy prices in the Euro zone) has more negative effects than in the USA.

But the European and American characteristics are similar. Contributions are negative or falling rapidly with the exception of services whose contribution in both regions has been stable since fall 2023. There is certainly a salary effect which generates persistence.

Contributions to the US inflation rate 4.0 Shelte Services ex Sh 3.0 Food 2.0 Good Energ 1.0 0.0 1.0 January 2020 - February24 2.0 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 Jan-24

2021

2022

echter c

2023

2024

Inflation Rates

12.00

10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00 0.00

-2.00

2018

- US

2019

Eurozone

2020

stream: Ostrum AM; ostrum.philip

Sources: Datastream: Ostrum AM: ostrum.phili

China

Chief Economist




Philippe Waechter

My blog - Ostrum.philippewaechter.com





Are we ready? I do not believe




Since the start of the year, climate alerts have multiplied.


There are multiple fire zones around the world as shown in the map above. Africa, the Amazon and Asia are experiencing very significant fires (on the map the period taken into account is 7 days)

On the first graph, we see that, since the start of the year and until March 4, the average global temperature is 1.7°C higher than the pre-industrial average.

Never before has such a situation occurred. The only comparable year is 2020 where over the same period of just over two months, the average temperature was 1.55°C.

	Deviation at average temperature 1850-1900
1.80	Annual Distances in
1.60	Aggregate Daily Averages by Decades 1940 to 2019
1.40	Average per year from 2020
1.20	Average for the period 1 January
1.00	- 4 March 1.14 1.24 1.25
0.80	0.91
	0.74
0.60	0.60
0.40	
0.20	0.27 0.24 0.29 0.31
0.00	0.24
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Sources: Copernicus; Ostrum AM; ostrum,philippewaechter.com	





The same drift is also observed for sea temperatures. Every day for the past year, the sea temperature has been the warmest on record.

On the graph I have taken the temperatures of the North Atlantic. The deviation from the average observed over the period 1982-2011 is increasing and the year 2024, until then, is well above the average plus 2 standard deviations.

The consequence is a considerable impact on marine life with transformations that will affect the entire balance of the globe.

In the third graph, it is the temperature in France which is breaking records. The graph shows the average monthly deviations with data from the period 1981-2010. For the past 2 years, average temperatures have been higher than the historical average. Winter didn't really exist.

The most worrying thing is the form of indifference in the face of all of these upheavals. These are discussed in summer, during heatwave periods, and were discussed a little during COP28 in November. Since then, questions have disappeared from general information while each day is more worrying than the day before.

In a report published last weekend, the European Environment Agency mentions the delay taken by Europe in facing the climate challenge even though it is one of the most advanced regions on this issue.






Europe and the risks of climate bifurcation

Europe has not yet taken stock of climate change. This is the message conveyed by the European Environment Agency in a report published at the start of the week.

At comparable latitudes, Europe is the region that is warming the fastest. This is due to its geographical position and the sea currents of the Atlantic.

The graph is indicative of the acceleration in temperature in Europe since the start of the 2010 decade. In light of this intensification, we can better understand the new objective of the European Commission which



wants to reduce carbon emissions by 90%, compared to 1990, by 2040 to take the risk of being carbon neutral in 2050.

+ * *

The alert issued by the European Environment Agency (EEA) is of two types.

Europe is experiencing global warming and must prepare for an extreme scenario given the limited commitments of States on this issue. It will be permanently on a trajectory higher than that of the average global temperature.

This is a challenge in itself. This means more frequent climatic events. Periods of heatwave, like in 2022, of abundant rain, large-scale fires and more marked drought. Such occurrences have consequences on productive dynamics, whether industrial or agricultural. This situation can also result in higher deaths during periods of intense heat. The figure is estimated between 60,000 and 70,000 on a European scale.

The EEA emphasizes the persistent effect of these climatic events combined with ordinary shocks. The impact can be multiplied, have a greater impact in scale and duration than this ordinary shock taken in isolation

The Agency also emphasizes the fact that Europe being vast, the repercussions of climate bifurcation will not be uniform. Not all regions will experience the same types of climatic events with the same intensity.

- Productive, social and societal systems will have to adapt quickly to this new framework.
- Adjustment requests and support policies will need to be adapted. The framework, which was modulated by the history of each country within Europe, will have to be fundamentally altered to deal with the specificities resulting from the impact of climate change.

This could cause tensions between countries. We can take the example of water which will affect Europe due to periods of drought greater in intensity and duration. The countries of the South will be more penalized than those of the North, thus potentially being a major source of tensions between European countries.

It is then that European institutions will have to be solid and effective to contain its dissensions. Europeans must all move in the same direction and it will be the role of the Commission, Parliament and Governments to ensure this. Otherwise Europe risks quickly being destabilized by local particularities. This is one of the dimensions of the European elections next June.





Chief Economist



Video of this week 15 Mars 2024

What is the link between world population, climate change and energy transition?



Transcription

The world population was 8 billion people in 2023.

It will be 9 billion in 2050 and beyond 2060 until 2100, it will be around 10 billion. The question that is asked is whether these additional 2 billion are compatible with the energy transition.

For this, three answers.

The first is that the climate change we are experiencing today is the result of carbon accumulated since the industrial revolution.

And this accumulated carbon is the work essentially, mainly, of industrialized countries. More than 55% of this accumulated carbon comes from industrialized countries, which are not the countries with the largest populations.

A country like India, which has 1.5 billion people, has accumulated only 3.5% of all carbon. It is more a problem of industrial development over time than of population.

The second point is that the countries with the highest emissions today, the United States, China, Europe, are countries that will experience a significant demographic transition. The stability of the population in the United States and the regression of this population in China and Europe.

As a result, the contribution of developed countries will be reduced.

And the third point is that the countries which will see their populations increase rapidly are countries, regions for which carbon emissions are today very reduced.

And therefore, they will necessarily contribute to the accumulation of carbon, but in a very limited way.

It is up to us, developed countries, to make the effort to compensate for this increase in carbon emitted to allow these regions to develop.

The links between carbon, climate change and population are not very precise. They are much more precise on other areas such as biodiversity and pollution.





Additional notes

Ostrum Asset Management

Asset management company regulated by AMF under n° GP-18000014 – Limited company with a share capital of 50 938 997 \bigcirc . Trade register n°525 192 753 Paris – VAT : FR 93 525 192 753 – Registered Office: 43, avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 75013 Paris – www.ostrum.com This document is intended for professional, in accordance with MIFID. It may not be used for any purpose other than that for which it was conceived and may not be copied, distributed or communicated to third parties, in part or in whole, without the prior written authorization of Ostrum Asset Management.

None of the information contained in this document should be interpreted as having any contractual value. This document is produced purely for the purposes of providing indicative information. This document consists of a presentation created and prepared by Ostrum Asset Management based on sources it considers to be reliable.

Ostrum Asset Management reserves the right to modify the information presented in this document at any time without notice, which under no circumstances constitutes a commitment from Ostrum Asset Management.

The analyses and opinions referenced herein represent the subjective views of the author(s) as referenced, are as of the date shown and are subject to change without prior notice. There can be no assurance that developments will transpire as may be forecasted in this material. This simulation was carried out for indicative purposes, on the basis of hypothetical investments, and does not constitute a contractual agreement from the part of Ostrum Asset Management.

Ostrum Asset Management will not be held responsible for any decision taken or not taken on the basis of the information contained in this document, nor in the use that a third party might make of the information. Figures mentioned refer to previous years. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Any reference to a ranking, a rating or an award provides no guarantee for future performance and is not constant over time. Reference to a ranking and/or an award does not indicate the future performance of the UCITS/AIF or the fund manager. Under Ostrum Asset Management's social responsibility policy, and in accordance with the treaties signed by the French government, the funds directly managed by Ostrum Asset Management do not invest in any company that manufactures, sells or stocks anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs.

Final version dated 28/02/2024

Natixis Investment Managers

This material has been provided for information purposes only to investment service providers or other Professional Clients, Qualified or Institutional Investors and, when required by local regulation, only at their written request. This material must not be used with Retail Investors. To obtain a summary of investor rights in the official language of your jurisdiction, please consult the legal documentation section of the website (im.natixis.com/intl/intl-fund-documents)

In the E.U.: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers International or one of its branch offices listed below. Natixis Investment Managers International is a portfolio management company authorized by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (French Financial Markets Authority – AMF) under no. GP 90-009, and a public limited company (société anonyme) registered in the Paris Trade and Companies Register under no. 329 450 738. Registered office: 43 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 75013 Paris. Italy: Natixis Investment Managers International Succursale Italiana, Registered office: Via San Clemente 1, 20122 Milan, Italy. Netherlands: Natixis Investment Managers International, Nederlands (Registration number 000050438298). Registered office: Stadsplateau 7, 3521AZ Utrecht, the Netherlands. Spain: Natixis Investment Managers International S.A., Sucursal en España, Serrano nº90, 6th Floor, 28006 Madrid, Spain. Sweden: Natixis Investment Managers International, Nordics Filial (Registration number 516412-8372- Swedish Companies Registration Office). Registered office: Covendrum Stockholm City AB, Kungsgatan 9, 111 43 Stockholm, Box 2376, 103 18 Stockholm, Sweden. Or,

Provided by Natixis Investment Managers S.A. or one of its branch offices listed below. Natixis Investment Managers S.A. is a Luxembourg management company that is authorized by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier and is incorporated under Luxembourg laws and registered under n. B 115843. Registered office of Natixis Investment Managers S.A.: 2, rue Jean Monnet, L-2180 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Germany: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Zweigniederlassung Deutschland (Registration number: HRB 88541). Registered office: Senckenberganlage 21, 60325 Frankfurt am Main. Belgium: Natixis Investment Managers S.A., Belgian Branch, Gare Maritime, Rue Picard 7, Bte 100, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium.

In Switzerland: Provided for information purposes only by Natixis Investment Managers, Switzerland Sàrl, Rue du Vieux Collège 10, 1204 Geneva, Switzerland or its representative office in Zurich, Schweizergasse 6, 8001 Zürich.

In the British Isles: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited which is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (register no. 190258) - registered office: Natixis Investment Managers UK Limited, One Carter Lane, London, EC4V 5ER. When permitted, the distribution of this material is intended to be made to persons as described as follows: in the United Kingdom: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at investment professionals and professional investors only; in Ireland: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at professional investors only; in Guernsey: this material is intended to and/or directed at only financial services providers which hold a license from the Guernsey Financial Services Commission; in Jersey: this material is intended to and/or directed at only financial services providers which hold a license from the Isle of Man: this material is intended to be communicated to and/or directed at only financial services providers which hold a license from the Isle of Man Financial Services Authority or insurers authorised under section 8 of the Insurance Act 2008.

In the DIFC: Provided in and from the DIFC financial district by Natixis Investment Managers Middle East (DIFC Branch) which is regulated by the DFSA. Related financial products or services are only available to persons who have sufficient financial experience and understanding to participate in financial markets within the DIFC, and qualify as Professional Clients or Market Counterparties as defined by the DFSA. No other Person should act upon this material.Registered office: UnitL10-02, Level 10, ICD Brookfield Place, DIFC, PO Box 506752, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

In Japan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Japan Co., Ltd. Registration No.: Director-General of the Kanto Local Financial Bureau (kinsho) No.425. Content of Business: The Company conducts investment management business, investment advisory and agency business and Type II Financial Instruments Business as a Financial Instruments Business Operator.

In Taiwan: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Securities Investment Consulting (Taipei) Co., Ltd., a Securities Investment Consulting Enterprise regulated by the Financial Supervisory Commission of the R.O.C. Registered address: 34F., No. 68, Sec. 5, Zhongxiao East Road, Xinyi Dist., Taipei City 11065, Taiwan (R.O.C.), license number 2020 FSC SICE No. 025, Tel. +886 2 8789 2788.





Additional notes

In Singapore: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Singapore Limited (NIM Singapore) having office at 5 Shenton Way, #22-05/06, UIC Building, Singapore 068808 (Company Registration No. 199801044D) to distributors and qualified investors for information purpose only. NIM Singapore is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore under a Capital Markets Services Licence to conduct fund management activities and is an exempt financial adviser. Mirova Division (Business Name Registration No.: 53431077W) and Ostrum Division (Business Name Registration No.: 53463468X) are part of NIM Singapore and are not separate legal entities. This advertisement or publication has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

In Hong Kong: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Hong Kong Limited to professional investors for information purpose only. In Australia: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Australia Pty Limited (ABN 60 088 786 289) (AFSL No. 246830) and is intended for the general information of financial advisers and wholesale clients only.

In New Zealand: This document is intended for the general information of New Zealand wholesale investors only and does not constitute financial advice. This is not a regulated offer for the purposes of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMCA) and is only available to New Zealand investors who have certified that they meet the requirements in the FMCA for wholesale investors. Natixis Investment Managers Australia Pty Limited is not a registered financial service provider in New Zealand.

In Colombia: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers International Oficina de Representación (Colombia) to professional clients for informational purposes only as permitted under Decree 2555 of 2010. Any products, services or investments referred to herein are rendered exclusively outside of Colombia. This material does not constitute a public offering in Colombia and is addressed to less than 100 specifically identified investors.

In Latin America: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers International.

In Uruguay: Provided by Natixis Investment Managers Uruguay S.A., a duly registered investment advisor, authorised and supervised by the Central Bank of Uruguay. Office: San Lucar 1491, Montevideo, Uruguay, CP 11500. The sale or offer of any units of a fund qualifies as a private placement pursuant to section 2 of Uruguayan law 18,627.

In Mexico: Provided by Natixis IM Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., which is not a regulated financial entity, securities intermediary, or an investment manager in terms of the Mexican Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores) and is not registered with the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) or any other Mexican authority. Any products, services or investments referred to herein that require authorization or license are rendered exclusively outside of Mexico. While shares of certain ETFs may be listed in the Sistema Internacional de Cotizaciones (SIC), such listing does not represent a public offering of securities in Mexico, and therefore the accuracy of this information has not been confirmed by the CNBV. Natixis Investment Managers is an entity organized under the laws of France and is not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any other Mexican authority. Any reference contained herein to "Investment Managers" is made to Natixis Investment Managers and/or any of its investment management subsidiaries, which are also not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any of its investment management subsidiaries, which are also not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any of its investment management subsidiaries, which are also not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any of its investment management subsidiaries, which are also not authorized by or registered with the CNBV or any other Mexican authority.

In Brazil: Provided to a specific identified investment professional for information purposes only by Natixis Investment Managers International. This communication cannot be distributed other than to the identified addressee. Further, this communication should not be construed as a public offer of any securities or any related financial instruments. Natixis Investment Managers International is a portfolio management company authorized by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (French Financial Markets Authority – AMF) under no. GP 90–009, and a public limited company (société anonyme) registered in the Paris Trade and Companies Register under no. 329 450 738. Registered office: 43 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 75013 Paris.

The above referenced entities are business development units of Natixis Investment Managers, the holding company of a diverse line-up of specialised investment management and distribution entities worldwide. The investment management subsidiaries of Natixis Investment Managers conduct any regulated activities only in and from the jurisdictions in which they are licensed or authorized. Their services and the products they manage are not available to all investors in all jurisdictions. It is the responsibility of each investment service provider to ensure that the offering or sale of fund shares or third party investment services to its clients complies with the relevant national law.

The provision of this material and/or reference to specific securities, sectors, or markets within this material does not constitute investment advice, or a recommendation or an offer to buy or to sell any security, or an offer of any regulated financial activity. Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks and expenses of any investment carefully before investing. The analyses, opinions, and certain of the investment themes and processes referenced herein represent the views of the portfolio manager(s) as of the date indicated. These, as well as the portfolio holdings and characteristics shown, are subject to change. There can be no assurance that developments will transpire as may be forecasted in this material. The analyses and opinions expressed by external third parties are independent and does not necessarily reflect those of Natixis Investment Managers. Past performance information presented is not indicative of future performance.

Although Natixis Investment Managers believes the information provided in this material to be reliable, including that from third party sources, it does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of such information. This material may not be distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.

All amounts shown are expressed in USD unless otherwise indicated.

Natixis Investment Managers may decide to terminate its marketing arrangements for this product in accordance with the relevant legislation www.ostrum.com