World history is generally shaped by a leading country. This has been the case since World War II with the United States and earlier with Great Britain. This hegemon provides the impetus and defines the rules and institutions.
In this history, there may be several hegemons because the world economy has not always been global, and there are several leaders who ignore each other. We think of Europe and China, which have long lived in separate worlds with only limited trade ties.
Yet there are particular moments, moments when the hegemon, the one who dominates, is called into question because a rival country emerges, London outclasses Amsterdam at the end of the 18th century or because it is incapable of assuming its status.
These shifts often give rise to economic and financial crises, and sometimes to conflicts or revolutions. A crisis is then defined as the period between the old framework, which no longer exists, and the new framework, which does not yet exist.
Questions of this type were raised, notably by Joseph Nye during Donald Trump’s first term regarding Sino-American relations. This issue is still relevant today, but it has taken on a new dimension as the leading country, the United States, gives the impression of sabotaging its status and no longer wanting to assume the responsibilities associated with its position.
To analyze these tipping points, historians have developed three analytical tools.
The first analytical tool is the Thucydide Trap. The concept originates from the Peloponnesian War, during which the Athenians, growing in power, incited Sparta to enter into conflict, because Sparta perceived Athens’ desire, genuine or not, to supplant it. It is a way of thinking about the dynamics of the forces present and the anticipations of the belligerents.
The second analytical framework is that developed by Fernand Braudel on the notion of the world-economy. The dynamics of the global economy are made up of world economies, driven by a reference city, which succeed one another, which coexist, and the risks of crisis when this framework changes. The transition from one reference city to another is a source of redefinition of powers and is generally accompanied by major crises.
The third concept is the Kindleberger trap, named after the American economist and historian. In his analysis of the 1930s crisis, he considers economic stability to be a public good managed by the hegemon. This works as long as the hegemon has the will to intervene. When its strategy diverges, the risk is great instability. Kindleberger points to the United Kingdom’s lack of will and ability, in 1931, to maintain this long-standing role, while its potential successor, the United States, does not yet have the will and/or the means to do so.
To be continued