Thucydide and Fernand Braudel allow us to understand the movements, Kindleberger is more in the analysis of the dynamics which are stalling.

For Thucydide, Sparta must enter into conflict with Athens, whose power is rapidly increasing. The intuitive approach is appealing because it seems legitimate and rational for understanding the behavior of those who feel threatened. In light of past conflicts, this analysis does not appear entirely relevant. There are few cases that meet the conditions mentioned by Thucydide. Thucydide’ insight is intended to help us reflect.

Braudel’s approach allows us to understand the dynamics of capitalism over time. Deformations are long-term, reflecting emerging constraints, new competition, or an expanding space. An important aspect of his analysis is the way power shifts from one city to another. This reveals ruptures and crisis situations, but also the robustness of capitalism.
The description of the European journey is fascinating. From Venice in 1380, the center of the world economy moved to Antwerp around 1500, then Genoa around 1550, then to Amsterdam around 1600 before shifting to London between 1780 and 1815. During the interwar period, the center of the world economy crossed the Atlantic and settled in New York.
It is this dynamic that suggests the current shift toward Asia and Beijing. After exhausting the American economy, capitalism is apparently shifting toward China.

Kindleberger’s approach appears, in a short timeframe, to be more immediate and more relevant. He believes that the global economy is not inherently stable and that, for its development to occur, an economy must be a leader in order to define rules and institutions. In his book on the Great Depression of the 1930s, Kindleberger highlights five conditions for ensuring this stability through the hegemon.

• Maintaining a relatively open market.
• The provision of countercyclical long-term loans.
• Monitoring the stability of exchange rates.
• Guaranteeing the coordination of macroeconomic policies.
• Acting as a lender of last resort during financial crises.

Kindleberger emphasizes these points and the fragility of the global economic system after the 1929 crisis. The exchange rate system paralyzes macroeconomic adjustment methods. In the panic, the coordination of economic policies no longer functions at all.
But the author insists on the inability of Great Britain to play this leadership role due to its inability to be the lender of last resort, while the United States, a potential leader, is not yet capable of playing this role.

The current analysis is based on Washington’s distrust and the question of accepting to be the lender of last resort.