The world that is emerging will not resemble the one collectively constructed until now. This integrated world had transparent borders and has lived.
In this world, the dollar reigns because it is perceived as the least risky currency (internationally there is an anti-Gresham’s law according to which good money drives out bad, the good one being the dollar). The euro has tried in vain to compete with it and the BRICs’ attempt at another currency has not been conclusive.

But the world is changing; the imbalances that now characterize it no longer point toward an expansion of globalization but rather toward a more local refocusing. The United States is implementing a more isolationist policy with China and Europe, considered non-allies on the international stage. This new approach, forced by Washington, could translate into a form of distrust toward American values ​​and the dollar.
A more vertical world, strengthened borders and less confidence in the greenback are all ingredients to encourage the formation of a sort of tripolar world.

Long ago, economists envisioned such a three-pole framework. Each pole would be centered on a country (the United States and China) and a geographic region (the eurozone), but also on a currency. Countries attached to the reference country would have an exchange rate fixed with the reference currency, which would fluctuate with the other two.

Such a framework raises many questions. The first is that of liquidity. During past crises, crises that would not disappear under this new framework, central banks have always demonstrated coordination to provide liquidity and prevent a collapse of the monetary system. Would such solidarity continue to work?
The transition period would inevitably be very long and therefore generate uncertainty for all stakeholders in the global economy. Exiting the dollar would not be an easy operation, given the greenback’s considerable role in financing the global economy. Establishing a new, stable framework would be a lengthy process, with an authoritarian dimension to its implementation.
This would also mean a form of withdrawal of economic activities to areas of influence and therefore a long and painful adjustment of growth and employment.
The loss of confidence in the dollar resulting from the White House’s policy will not spontaneously translate into a new framework. The processes are long and chaotic, with the risk of being associated with conflicts, since the lack of adjustment within each zone would cause tensions that could become unbearable.
The American shift, its autocratic dimension, and its isolationism do not reassure investors about American assets and the dollar. But the inevitable shift will bring chaos.