The transformations of the world and the management of global issues in the form of a balance of power will profoundly modify the collective response to an imbalance.
Shocks will be more frequent and more persistent. Less coordination of economic cycles between major regions will generate more shocks. Less cooperation between different entities in a fragmented world will generate more persistence.
We will need to rethink our collective approach to shock prevention. We will also need to implement new instruments and define new objectives to take into account more fragile cooperation and coordination that will not happen spontaneously. Adjustment will be longer and more costly.
↪️ Since the Plaza Accord
The shocks suffered since the Plaza Accord in September 1985 have been part of a coordinated global framework with a great deal of complementarity in the actions of the regulatory authorities.
↪️ The United States as lender of last resort
These shocks were generally financial. In the face of them, historical and institutional construction relied on the dollar as the international currency and on the US Federal Reserve as the leader of central banks in the action to be taken.
In other words, the United States was the hegemon of a world that was globalizing in a coherent form. It played the role of lender of last resort.
↪️ A robust mode of regulation
This coherent dynamic which developed in Western countries expanded with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then with the introduction of China into the concert of economic exchanges.
Throughout this long journey, the United States, as leader and regulator, has not really been challenged. This has resulted in a phase of robust, low-inflationary global growth.
This is the so-called period of great moderation which in developed countries resulted in low volatility growth and inflation rates, accentuating the role of central banks in managing affairs.
↪️ A collective will
One way to think about this is to think that all participants may have wanted the model to continue beyond shocks. It was therefore in the collective interest to do everything possible to return to the previous trend. The common dynamic was one that was desirable for all and desired by all.
Collective regulation was in everyone’s interest.
The actions of the central banks made it possible to smooth out all the rough edges that could cause new imbalances and lead the global economy towards a lasting crisis.
The management of the major crisis of 2008/2009, the most brutal since 1929, was effective since the economy was moving forward again in the spring of 2009.
Continued tomorrow, September 2