The current crisis differs fundamentally from previous ones in its very nature. In 2008, the shock was financial and identifiable; in 2020, it was a health crisis and universal. In both cases, a coordinated and shared response was able to emerge because the rules of the game were common and the tools were available.
Today, we are faced with a layering of tensions — geopolitical, energy, trade, institutional. Each source of tension is complex in itself, and the combination of all these tensions can seem inextricable if none of the actors are willing to compromise.
The rise of these risks has been gradual, but the conflict with Iran has disrupted the entire system of reference points. This type of decision, primarily political, makes any rational, collective response impossible. When the main risk is political and dependent on a single individual, forecasting becomes a precarious exercise.
The economic consequences of this shift are immediate and asymmetrical. The epicenter is located in a region that is strategic for fossil fuels: a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would cause oil prices to remain above $100 for an extended period, straining supply chains and reigniting inflation. Asia, heavily dependent on this corridor, is more exposed than Europe or the United States.
The most relevant historical parallel is not 2022—a primarily European crisis—but the first oil shock: if the conflict persists, the sustained high price of oil would alter the decision-making processes of economic actors over time. It is this long-term shift that creates the rupture and the change in perspectives.
Central banks are thus walking a tightrope. Doing nothing if inflation persists risks a loss of credibility, which would translate into high long-term interest rates. But this comes at a significant short-term economic cost.
The real problem is the inability to find a collective response. In 2009, the G20 summit in London embodied a desire for coordination. Sharing the pandemic’s impact over time was a rational collective choice.
Today, this capacity has frayed: institutions appear less robust, the rules of collective functioning are disintegrating, and respect for these rules is fading. The world is fragmenting, China is waiting for the United States to exhaust itself, Middle Eastern countries are questioning the security they had delegated to the US, and American political instability is eroding a long-standing structuring reference point. The crisis also reveals the fragility of alliances, paving the way for more opportunistic realignments. Europe, for its part, has not yet built the common narrative that would justify bolder choices.
Politics thus becomes the number one factor in global risk, in a more fragmented world, where local and individual protection replaces the common solution.
