After 100 days in the White House, the contours of Donald Trump’s policy are easier to discern. We can better see the key elements around which the presidential project is structured. This does not diminish the unpredictability of his policies. In fact, uncertainty surrounding economic policy remains very high, constraining the behavior of consumers, businesses, and investors.

However, three scenarios emerge.

The first is an easing of tensions.
The negotiations that Washington has been calling for are taking shape and yielding results. The Americans are making concessions, but so are the Chinese and Europeans. This reflects the realization that the risk is excessive and that it would be good to return to a more defined framework. The dollar is regaining investor confidence.
The institutions at work are amended to take into account the demands of all participants in the negotiations.
Note: This attractive scenario solves nothing. If the globalization cycle has gone haywire, it’s because of technological competition between the United States and China. It’s hard to see what could change the Chinese’s retaliatory behavior, given that they need American products less than Americans need Chinese products.

The second scenario is that of a failed discussion.
Negotiations are not moving forward because a major issue for the Americans is the decoupling of the rest of the world from China. The Middle Kingdom has no interest in showing allegiance. The situation, with customs tariffs sometimes adjusted, is neither cooperative nor coordinated.
The world is organizing itself in a multipolar form with three or four major regions, each seeking to gain autonomy. Such a structure raises questions about the relationships between zones, the shape of the exchange rate, and the role of the dollar, which no longer has any reason to be the reference currency. Central banks, whose coordination was essential in globalization, no longer have the same role or the same objectives. It is therefore necessary to rewrite the rules and relationships and build the associated institutions.
Note: This is the most likely scenario in which the Americans and Chinese do not give in. But then everything has to be built, and the volatility of activity and alliances could be high.

The third scenario is that of escalating tensions.
The Chinese and Americans trade blows, and the rest of the world, stunned, only notes the negative impacts of such a configuration. This rising tension could recall the 1930s, with significant risks of conflict.
Note: The worst-case scenario is one in which everyone loses. Institutional issues are too complex to resolve, and only conflict in all its forms seems acceptable. Alas.