“The Trump administration’s political ambitions for Europe mean that, for now, America is also an adversary,” concludes Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times after US Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.
The rapprochement with Vladimir Putin, the solution proposed for the war in Ukraine, the political rapprochement with extremist parties in Europe generally not very favourable to European institutions and the announcement of the introduction of a 25% tax on American imports of European products are taken together as strong signals of a radical change in Washington’s position.

Tensions between the two regions have existed in the past, but never has there been such a diversion of interest in the fate of Europeans. Europe was not built on a dynamic of the balance of power and this is not in the logic of the new US administration. For it, it is necessary to be able to exert pressure so that the strongest obtains what it wants. Therefore, for Washington, cooperation and coordination, which are the tools of European construction, are unnatural. Moreover, this also reflects support for extreme parties that are generally hostile to the institutions that made Europe.

As a result, if America is now an adversary, European leaders must ask themselves what they must do to protect themselves and have greater autonomy. The objective must no longer be to satisfy Washington but to prepare for the worst, for an unprecedented situation in which Europe will have to make choices that will allow it to define itself and set itself on a trajectory.

There are two dimensions to this. The first is internal, the second is the positioning of Europe in relation to the rest of the world.

Internal choices will be decisive because the model that will have to be put in place will be of a very different nature from that put in place over the years since the 1950s.
A first aspect is that of the reinforcement of military expenditure. This is the hot topic of the moment because we must go back. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the weight in military expenditure has decreased. These are the dividends of peace. The world after 1989 was no longer that of the Cold War confrontation and NATO protected the Europeans.
The war in Ukraine and recent US statements challenge these assumptions.

The UK has already announced a military spending target of 2.5% of GDP. The Baltic and Scandinavian countries are on alert.
The public debt, already at 81.6% of GDP in the 3rd quarter of 2024, indicates that the room for maneuver is reduced. So, how can we spend more on the military and how can we arbitrate in relation to other social, sovereign and climate expenditures?

To be continued tomorrow…